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#openstack-nova - 2024-05-20
19:11:24 melwitt right
19:11:30 sean-k-mooney we would use the flavor/iamge properties
19:11:36 sean-k-mooney and unlike the adoptied ones
19:11:44 sean-k-mooney each lvm disk would have its own key
19:11:49 sean-k-mooney just like with qcow
19:12:14 melwitt yes, that is what I thought the spec was intending
19:12:18 melwitt to not have two separate ways of doing local encryption
19:12:33 sean-k-mooney right
19:12:45 melwitt and in the process lvm gains some new user friendly abilities as a result
19:13:00 sean-k-mooney but that would only result in host tha tuse lvm reporting COMPUTE_EPHEMERAL_ENCRYPTION
19:13:10 sean-k-mooney after we supprot upgrading the exiting instnaces
19:13:32 melwitt ok. so all that said, my understanding was that for the current chunk we're trying to do now in dalmatian we are only doing luks and leaving lvm as the legacy config options at this time
19:13:50 sean-k-mooney yep
19:13:54 sean-k-mooney thats what i tought too
19:14:08 sean-k-mooney so supporting rbd,raw/flat,qcow
19:14:17 sean-k-mooney but not lvm
19:14:26 melwitt ok. so it seems then that we would hold off on introducing hw_ephemeral_encryption_format until we work on the lvm support
19:14:31 melwitt right
19:14:37 sean-k-mooney and the exisitng lvm fature will be deprecate but not removed until we can adopt them into the new framework
19:15:23 sean-k-mooney yes we would only need hw_ephemeral_encryption_format if we supprot somethign other hten luksv1
19:16:11 sean-k-mooney which also means if os_glance_encrypt_format is set to anything other then luks we shoudl reject that too right
19:16:31 melwitt ok, I think we all agree about that. so I'll update the spec to explain this in a lot of detail 😂 and that hw_ephemeral_encryption_format will not be part of this first chunk and that it would come into play only when we work on adding support for lvm
19:17:02 sean-k-mooney and do we agree the same is true for the config option
19:17:22 melwitt I think it would be reasonable to reject that yes, if os_glance_encrypt_format is not luks. we won't be able to honor it
19:17:40 sean-k-mooney ok
19:18:15 melwitt I think I made the config option a choices= where the only choice is luks
19:18:17 melwitt but I'll double check and make it that if it isn't already
19:18:30 sean-k-mooney ok
19:18:40 sean-k-mooney if its only luks then i dont think we need it personally
19:20:13 melwitt that's a fair point. I suppose all it could potentially be helping with transparency but I could see the argument not to have it
19:20:23 opendevreview Merged openstack/nova master: Enable OCaaS for several nova jobs https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova/+/919738
19:20:26 sean-k-mooney i think what we are setteling on is we only need 1 extra spec/image property the boolean hw:ephemeral_encryption/hw_ephemeral_encryption
19:20:40 melwitt that is also my understanding
19:20:44 sean-k-mooney and if that is unset and the image in encyped then the vm would be encypted too
19:20:53 sean-k-mooney meaning you dont have to opt in for encypted images
19:21:04 melwitt yes, that's what I understand as well
19:21:20 sean-k-mooney so there is only one last bit i want to check
19:22:00 sean-k-mooney will we allow an opt out via the flavor i.e. hw:ephemeral_encryption=false and os_glance_encrypt_format=luks
19:22:06 sean-k-mooney should that be a 409 conflict
19:22:09 sean-k-mooney or decypt the image
19:22:15 melwitt the main thing is I think we want to avoid an unpleasant surprise on that. similar to the encrypted rescue image, not to just decrypt it
19:22:47 melwitt I think the desire based on current code review comments is that it would decrypt in that case
19:22:51 sean-k-mooney personally im feeling like hw:ephemeral_encryption=false and os_glance_encrypt_format=luks woudl be a 409 conflict at least for now
19:23:09 melwitt yeah, I think it would be fair to start with that
19:23:50 sean-k-mooney the reason i hesitate there is it would allow anyoen in the same project (realy that has access to the image secret) to trivially/acidentaly decypt the image
19:24:14 melwitt and tack on a separate patch that enables the ability to request decryption
19:24:18 melwitt because it's like a user experience thing. not really "required" but nice to have to give users that ability
19:24:23 sean-k-mooney its not uncommon for peopel to query flavors by size and select the first one that they find
19:24:30 melwitt yeah. that would be my only concern with it as well
19:25:03 sean-k-mooney to be fair if thte image had os_glance_encrypt_format=luks hw_ephemeral_encryption=ture
19:25:27 sean-k-mooney i think we all agree it should be a 409 conflict if the flavor has hw:ephemeral_encryption=false
19:26:00 sean-k-mooney but since the arguement is being made that os_glance_encrypt_format=luks effectivly implies hw_ephemeral_encryption=ture
19:26:33 sean-k-mooney im wonderin if we shoudl also imply it when comparing ot a flavor with hw:ephemeral_encryption=false
19:26:35 melwitt I expect we all agree that's an ok first step. we've been trying to keep patches smaller in this thing as well so I have been splitting smaller things like that into their own patch
19:26:49 sean-k-mooney ok
19:27:28 sean-k-mooney so before this converstaion i was tending to say "ok ill approve the spec and we can take it to the implemeation" no i feel like we were not on the same page but have got much closer
19:27:45 sean-k-mooney so my stomach say i shoudl have breakfast/dinner
19:27:55 sean-k-mooney but i also dont really want to leave this open
19:28:04 sean-k-mooney so melwitt how do you want to proceed
19:28:18 melwitt yeah so I was thinking if os_glance_encrypt_format=luks (and really mainly just the presence of os_glance_encrypt_key_id) then if hw:ephemeral_encryption=false is in direct conflict and would act the same as the image conflict. until we offer decryption later if we do that
19:29:29 sean-k-mooney ack i think that is logicaly consitent
19:30:03 sean-k-mooney i feel like os_glance_encrypt_key_id is only valid if all the other os_glance_encrypt_* are dfeind
19:30:15 melwitt sean-k-mooney: I think it would probably be best to update the spec now. either way I will update it -- if it gets approved as-is I will still have an amendment proposed shortly. to not forget all this stuff
19:30:17 melwitt so either way is fine with me
19:30:26 melwitt I agree. I think that is the intent in the standardized properties anyway
19:30:29 sean-k-mooney so its not clear to me if we shoudl be checking any spefici one of those keys or if any of them exist
19:32:16 melwitt yeah.. I'll probably add validation for that just to make a better experience. I'm not sure if they are all required to be set from a glance perspective. like, will glance reject upload of an image that only sets one or a subset of them? or maybe if it does allow it, it will fill it defaults itself
19:32:29 melwitt so either way on the nova side we would expect/require them all to be set if one is set
19:32:38 sean-k-mooney so the glance spec used ot have a seperate nova spec https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/nova-specs/+/608696/11/specs/train/approved/image-encryption.rst
19:32:43 sean-k-mooney for how we would use those
19:33:27 melwitt from my perspective at a minimum if os_glance_encrypt_key_id is set, then os_glance_encrypt_format is required
19:33:31 sean-k-mooney in that they explictly talk about adding supprot for decypting the encyped image when booting the instnace
19:33:59 sean-k-mooney melwitt: ya i think those two are requried and likely the type as well i.e. symetic
19:34:15 melwitt ah ok
19:34:17 sean-k-mooney having said that i think we are only going to support symmetric encption
19:34:26 melwitt ah right
19:34:30 sean-k-mooney so i guess if its single valued
19:34:34 sean-k-mooney it does not matter for now
19:36:01 sean-k-mooney melwitt: you know what would help
19:36:14 melwitt yeah, we can adapt that as we go along. if we think more than just those two should be required to be present to be valid
19:36:18 melwitt because the other use case is an individual user uploading an encrypted image
19:36:26 sean-k-mooney in your spec can you define the only values of the os_glance_encrypt* properties that will actully work for now
19:36:28 melwitt so not sure if they will be required to provide all image properties
19:37:53 sean-k-mooney like will you be using os_glance_decrypt_size?
19:38:11 sean-k-mooney i dont think you are your using virt_size + 1G in the check right
19:38:15 melwitt sure I can add specifics about which ones we are requiring
19:38:35 melwitt there is a check for that somewhere actually
19:38:39 sean-k-mooney well it might hjsut be good to say hay nova is not using os_glance_decrypt_size
19:39:12 melwitt today we validate image size in some way and I had to add the "plus overhead" to the calc if encrypted for it to pass
19:39:19 sean-k-mooney right
19:39:41 sean-k-mooney but if i rememebr reviewing that code we do not use os_glance_decrypt_size
19:40:22 melwitt yeah I guess really i could use os_glance_decrypt_size instead for the validation if the image is encrypted. since that's what we actually care about, is if the decrypted size will fit in the chosen flavor
19:40:46 melwitt no we didn't have os_glance* properties proposed at the time
19:40:49 sean-k-mooney os_glance_decrypt_size and os_glance_decrypt_container_format i think are for the usecase of booting form an encypted iamge and decypting it on the host
19:40:56 melwitt well, sorry
19:41:03 sean-k-mooney which would imply they expect the virtual_size to include the overhead
19:41:06 melwitt they were proposed already but we were not planning to use them initially
19:41:09 sean-k-mooney when its encypted
19:41:24 melwitt but at the ptg we agreed to use them so I will be changing where needed to use those instead of what I had put
19:41:52 sean-k-mooney sure but os_glance_decrypt_size is defied as "size after payload decryption"

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